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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a munici-
pal corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD 
COMMISSIONi OSCAR A. ROBIN; and 
HARDY SCALES CO., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. l4030 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This respondent agrees with appellant's statement 
of the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of all 
defendants and respondents, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Ogden City seeks the affirmance of the trial 
court's determination and judgment of no cause of action in 
favor of all defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts submitted by the appellant 
are substantially correct but the city adopts the more com-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plete statement of facts made in the brief of Respondents 
Robin and Hardy Scales Company with the additional statement 
that the appellant filed its claim with Ogden City, on which 
this action is based, on September 3, 1968. The option, on 
which the suit is based, is dated September 30, 1965 and it 
expired by its terms December 31, 1966. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE OPTION WAS DEFECTIVE AND INCOMPLETE AND WAS, 
THEREFORE, NOT A BINDING CONTRACT. 
The option was drawn by the State Road Commission 
(R-560). It is to be construed against that commission in the 
event of ambiguity or uncertainty. Jensen vs. Anderson, 24 Ut. 
2d 191, 468 P.2d 366, first head note reads "Option Agreement 
would be strictly construed against party who drew it." 
The option clearly indicates as was testified to by 
the representatives of the Road Commission at the trial that 
it is in effect a hunting license. Witness Shrader, page 585J> 
line 14-173 testified for appellant: "I think that a con-
tractor before he even submits a bid, I think, should find 
out from the property owner if material is available or not." 
It merely attempted to advise potential or successful bidders 
as to where they might negotiate for and perhaps obtain fill 
material. The amount of fill to be sold, "if any", by the 
City was left to future negotiations, also, the removal of 
any material thereafter to be removed was at the owner's lines 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and grades. It is obvious that a very critical element of a 
contract is missing from this document, and that is the amount 
of fillj if any, the City would be "willing to have removed 
from this property. Appellant's witness Shrader (R-586) 
testified that under this "option11 "the property owner could 
limit it to six inches or to top soil." 
At the trial this interpretation was clearly shown 
by the evidence presented that the property is very valuable 
industrial property located at a strategic intersection of 
freeways (R-759)* It was further testified that the sanitary 
sewer is available, (R-762) culinary water is available and the 
property lends itself to easy and profitable industrial develop 
ment in its present condition but, if it is cut down as the 
plaintiff desired, its usefullness for industrial purposes 
would be practically destroyed (R-.76I -765). No reasonably 
intelligent owner of this property would, under any circum-
stances, have allowed the removal of the material claimed by 
the plaintiff. Such removal would have left slopes on that 
property to be maintained and stabilized by the owner. Those 
slopes would have made about three acres of the property, 
under the slopes, totally unusable. Such land removal would 
have required pumps to get the sanitary sewage into the sewer 
lines at a substantial cost and inconvenience. The access to 
the land would have been up an incline which would have to be 
maintained as well as using additional land for the incline 
(R.76I.765). 
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These potential problems needed further negotiations 
by the land owner and anyone desiring to remove any soil from 
this property. 
In no way does the option agreement either mention., 
hint at, or in any other way allude to any amounts of materials, 
let alone 500,000 cubic yards as mentioned in plaintiff's 
complaint. 
In Hansen v. Snell, 11 Ut. 2d 64, 354 P.2d 1070 
(i960), this court held that where a real estate listing 
contract stated "terms to suit the seller," seller was justi-
fied in asking for $5,000 down and $400 per month with ten 
per cent interest on the unpaid balance even though those 
terms prohibited the sale as a practical matter. In a well 
reasoned opinion, the court stated: 
"She (.the seller) cannot be held to any other 
commitment than that expressed therein: that 
she would sell the property on her own terms." 
P. 1072 Pac. .-.;.. 
In the present case, Ogden City can be held to no 
other commitment than that expressed in the option; that is, 
if at some future time the parties negotiate and agree that a 
certain amount of materials is to be taken, and establish lines 
and grades, etc. then the price will be $.03 per cubic yard. 
Any agreements as to specific amounts of materials in the 
option, or commitments to furnish any materials whatsoever 
just aren't there. 
If a contract is so indefinite that the courts can't 
-4~ 
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determine what is specifically contracted for, it is unen-
forceable. 
In Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Ut. 2d 6l, 362 P.2d 
427 (1961), plaintiff sought to have a promissory note 
cancelled which he had given to defendants. Plaintiff alleged 
that the note was a part of a side agreement on the sale of 
several mink. Plaintiff could not delineate the sale agree-
ment with sufficient certainty to satisfy the court that the 
agreement sould be enforced. This court stated that a con-
tract requires definiteness to be enforceable. 
nA condition precedent to the enforcement of 
any contract is that there be a meeting of 
the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled~lrmt, either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." 
P. 42b (Emphasis added) : ~~ 
Even though it is evident no minds met as to amounts, 
such amounts, if agreed upon, are not stated with any definite-
ness or at all. The plain, simple wording of the contract 
clearly declares that the City of Ogden reserved the right so 
to determine amounts. The contract requires future arrange-
ments to be "made for each, or any, occupancy or removal." 
And, according to the option, any materials which may be 
removed "must positively be removed to the owner1s lines 
and grades." Thus, if at some future time some amount might 
be agreed upon to be taken, arrangements for those amounts 
would have to be made, including what amount, what lines and 
what grades. From the plain wording of the agreement, it is 
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evident that no minds met as to these items. The City cannot 
be held liable for something for which it did not contract* 
The case of Davison, et al. vs. Robbing, et al, 
30 Ut. 2d 338, 517 P-2d 1026 (1973)j involves a writing 
which did not describe the property to be sold. This court 
held the contract unenforceable. It holds "Parol evidence 
is admissible to apply, not to supply, a description of lands 
in a contract.M 
No one can say that the contract in question mentions 
any amount at all, let alone with sufficient definiteness to 
be enforceable. 
The "optionrf did not make an enforceable agreement 
between the parties, therefore, it is illusory and unenforceable. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
THE OPTION IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 
COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
This "option" does not comply with Section 25-5-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953^ for much the same reasons as set 
forth under the previous argument. Clearly, the statute of 
frauds requires the writing to contain all the elements of 
the contract. This writing does not define the amount of 
fill to be removed and it, therefore, does not comply with 
the statute of frauds and it is unenforceable. 
The case of Birdzell v. Utah Refining Co., 121 Ut. 
412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952), was an action for damages for breach 
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of an oral contract to sub-lease land. The plaintiff used 
a letter from the defendant as the memorandum in writing to 
satisfy the statute of frauds. The court held the memorandum 
insufficient. The court said on page 580 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"it is fundamental that the memorandum which 
is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds 
must contain all the essential terms and 
provisions of the contract Hawaiian 
Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., Utah, 207 P.2d 
7§4. As will be noted, the letter does not 
state what amount the rent shall be but 
expiessly leaves that question open for 
further negotiations. In an oral contract to 
execute a lease for a period longer than one 
year, the amount of the rent is clearly one of 
the essential terms which must appeal in a 
memorandum. The court in Rohan v. Proctor, 
6l Cal.App. W f , 214 P. 986, 988, stated that 
!tit may be stated as settled law that a 
memorandum of agreement for a lease which is 
required to be in writing, in order to satisfy 
the statute of frauds, must contain all the 
essential and material parts of the lease which 
is to be executed thereafter according to its 
terms, and particularly must contain three 
essentials in order to (sic) its validity under 
the statute of frauds. These are: First, a 
definite agreement as to the extent and boundary 
of the property to be leased; second, a definite 
and agreed term; and third, a definite and 
agreed rental and the time and manner of its 
payment.!! 
The essential item left out in that writing was 
the amount of the rental. In the case at bar, the essential 
item left out of the "option" is the amount of material to be 
removed, if any. 
In Baugh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 8l4, 27 Ut. 2d 291, 
the court held there was no memorandum in writing sufficient 
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to take the claimed agreement for the purpose of rent out of 
statute of frauds. The court cited the Birdzell case with 
approval and, in that case the default was that the land to 
be exchanged was not adequately described and, therefore, 
the statute of frauds was not satisfied. 
The appellant argues that even though this agreement 
is vague and incomplete, the court should determine that it is 
still a binding contract and the city is obligated to supply 
the fill dirt from the land involved to the extent that a 
"reasonablerr owner would supply. The city totally disagrees 
with this concept. Land has been considered a unique item 
and the option reserved to Ogden City full control of this 
unique property. That control included the right to determine 
how much, if any, was to be removed and exactly the lines and 
grades of that removal. For the Court to now substitute its 
determination as to what is reasonable removal when the city 
reserved total control is for the court to make a totally new 
and different contract on behalf of the city. 
In the recent case of Thomas J. Peck v, Lee Rock 
Products, 515 P.2d 446, 30 Ut. 2d 187, the item which was 
indefinite was the price. The applicable contract provision 
read as follows: 
"Added Option 
"Upon mutual agreement between Clinton L. Lee 
and Thomas J. Peck, Thomas J. Peck shall have 
the option to buy the equipment and business 
-fl-
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from Clinton L. Lee for the price to be 
mutually agreed upon by both parties at any 
such time after business Is in complete 
operation. The price shall be determined by 
two competent appraisers and agreed upon by 
both concerned parties - Lee and Peck. 
"The payment is to be mutually agreed upon 
by both partlesT*1 
Certainly, a reasonable price is a much easier item for the 
court to have determined than how much fill can reasonably be 
removed from a piece of valuable industrial property. In the 
Peck case, the Utah Supreme Court held the option to purchase 
illusory and indefinite and unenforceable. The court did not 
hold, as the plaintiff urges in this case, that the parties 
intended a reasonable price which the court would undertake to 
determine and make the option enforceable. 
Likewise, in the Birdzell case, supra, the only 
critical item left out of the memorandum was the amount of 
the rental for the property involved. Under the plaintiff!s 
theory, the court in that case would have held the parties 
intended a reasonable rent and would have made a determination 
of what that amount would be. The court did not do that, it 
held that the proposed agreement was unenforceable because 
the parties had not agreed on and reduced to writing the 
essential item in that case, the amount of the rent, in the 
case at bar the essential item not agreed to and not reduced 
to writing was the amount of fill to be removed.. This 
agreement is, therefore, unenforceable as it does not comply 
with the statute of frauds. 
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In the event the court does interpret the contract 
that the city is bound to supply the amount of material 
reasonable under the circumstances, the amount authorized 
would, in no event, exceed six feet average depth because 
no reasonable owner would consent to destroying or to even 
slightly decrease the value of this property for industrial 
purposes in exchange for fill material at three cents per 
cubic yard. To determine the reasonable amount, the income 
to the owner balanced against the damage to the land would 
be the most critical factor to consider. The undisputed 
testimony is that the land is worth at least $10,000.00 
an, acre (R-765) f o r industrial purposes. The removal of 
500,000 yards would have netted the owner $15,000.00 (R-76'3) 
for the material and it would have decreased the value of 
the land for industrial purposes from $10,000.00 an acre 
to $500.00 an acre (R-765). The removal of an average of 
six feet at the very most would have been authorized by any 
reasonable owner and, as testified by Mr. Griffin, this 
would have produced 198,000 yards (R-568). 
Another problem arises, if the court takes the 
reasonable amount theory, the damages testified to by the 
plaintiff's agents would not be applicable. That amount of 
fill would have been used south of the railroad crossing and 
many of the cost factors included in plaintiff's computation 
would not be applicable and no damage figures could be 
-10-
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determined. 
The appellant puts much reliance on the discussion 
between the assistant city engineer> Ray Kimball, and the 
representative of Gibbons and Reed. Interpreting this dis-
cussion most favorably to the appellant3 it does not cure the 
defects in the "option11 or it does not satisfy the statute of 
frauds requirement/ The validity of the option as a binding 
contract or its compliance "with the statute of frauds are to 
be determined by the document itself and not by parol evidence 
of subsequent events. Davison v. Robbins, supra. . 
ARGUMENT 
I I I •• 
OGDEN CITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE 
"OPTION" WAS TOO VAGUE AND THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE. 
The claimed estoppel seems to be based on the 
discussion between Mike Gibbons and C. R. Kimball, Assistant 
Engineer, That conversation should be put into its proper 
perspective. Gibbons -was referred to Kimball by Kimball's 
V 
old friends at Gibbons and Reed (R-617)• The conversation seems 
to be primarily a discussion as to how much dirt would result 
from various removal depths. There is no clear statement 
that Mr. Kimball attempted to authorize on behalf of the city, 
the removal of any dirt or to any specific depth. Kimball's 
deposition states there was no attempt by him to establish 
lines or grades or by anyone in the city engineering office 
known to him (R-786). It was primarily an engineering dis-
cussion, not to the question as to how much the city, land-
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ownerj would allow removed. There is no testimony that Kimball 
purported or authorized the removal to any depth, Mr. Kimball 
was an employee only of the engineering department, he was not 
the city engineer, the public works director or the city manager. 
His authority was limited to advising the city engineer (R-756) 
(R-784). These facts were known or should have been known to 
Gibbons. The dealings concerning the option were made with 
Kelley as public works director and with Sam Hood as city 
manager. That alone is notice that the action of those officials 
would be required as to this important item as to depth of 
removal from this very expensive, valuable industrial property. 
Any damages Gibbons suffered was due to their own conclusions 
and desires. Appellant apparently desired to remove as much 
dirt from this land as it could because its location and the 
cost was very low. It made these determinations without any 
consideration of the landowner's interests. As testified by 
Mr. Kelley, the removal of the amount of dirt claimed would 
substantially destroy this very valuable property for industrial 
purposes. It would require the installation of sanitary sewer 
pumps where the land in its present condition can be served 
by sanitray sewer by gravity (R-762). Such removal would 
result in steep slopes, difficult to stabilize and expensive 
to maintain (R-760, 76l 762 and 764). Such removal would 
require expensive, inconvenient, land consuming access roads 
(R-762). All of these factors would substantially reduce the 
-12-
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value of the property for its obvious use as prime industrial 
property—according to Kelley from $10,000.00 an acre to 
$500.00 an acre (R-765) . All of these facts were known or 
should have been known to the appellant and rather than 
assuming that it could remove as much dirt as it wanted, it 
should have considered the landowners position and negotiated 
with the officials of the city who had authority to act and 
take into consideration these factors which would result in 
only a small amount of dirt being removed from this property 
so that it could still retain its very valuable use as 
industrial land. Mr. Gibbons discussed none of these items with 
Mr. Kimbal l (R-619, 621) . Appe l lan t w a s going t o handle t h i s 
valuable industrial land the same as a gravel pit with no 
concern for its use for industry (R-618). 
ARGUMENT 
IV 
THE OPTION, EVEN IF VALID, WAS NEVER EXERCISED TO 
BECOME A BINDING CONTRACT TO SELL MATERIALS FROM THE LAND. 
The court found and the record shows that no demand 
was made for any fill to any responsible and authorized 
city official. The option, even if valid, was never exercised. 
There was, therefore, no breach by the city, even assuming a 
valid option. Mr. Reed, for appellant, testified no demand 
was made on the city (R-64-0, 61*1 and 6M-5) • 
The Utah State Road Commission, in its brief, states 
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that the option agreement was enforceable and that Ogden City 
should respond in damages to Gibbons and Reed. The city's 
answers to this argument are set forth in Argument I and IT 
of this brief, i.e. the option is illusory and unenforceable 
and that it does not comply with the statute of frauds. That 
being the case, the appellant does not have any claim against 
any defendant, including the State Road Commission based on 
that "option." If the State Road Commission has other obli-
gations to appellant on the bidding documents, as claimed 
by appellant, that does not involve the city. 
ARGUMENT 
V 
ANY DAMAGES SUFFERED BY APPELLANT WERE NOT CAUSED 
BY OGDEN CITY. 
Any damages suffered by Gibbons and Reed were due 
to the unreasonable and unfounded assumptions of its officers 
or employees. None of those losses were caused by Ogden City. 
It is amazing that such an experienced contractor and its 
officers would assume that Ogden City, or any other property 
owner would consent to receive $15,000.00 (which is 3^ a yard 
for 500,000 cubic yards of fill (R-765)) and allow the des-
truction of about twenty acres of prime industrial property 
which is reasonably worth $10,000.00 an acre (R-765) or a 
total of $200,000.00 before the dirt removal, but approxi-
mately only $500.00 per acre (R-765) or a total of $10,000.00 
after the removal. The appellant's officers should have 
-14-
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assumed the landowner would reasonably protect its land and 
not allow its destruction and made their assumptions accordingly. 
The appellant's losses, if any, are not the city's obligation. 
ARGUMENT 
VI 
ASSUMING THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM THERE ARE NOT FINDINGS 
ON ALL ISSUES IS CORRECT, THE FINDINGS MADE DISPOSE OF THE 
CASE AND FINDINGS ON OTHER ISSUES ARE UNNECESSARY. 
The case is disposed of by the findings which were 
made and it is purposeless and unnecessary to make findings 
on the other issues. The findings support the judgment and 
the judgment should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
VII 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY WAS NOT TIMELY 
FILED. 
The option was dated September 31, 1965, and It 
expired by its term December 31, 1966. The claim against 
Ogden City was filed by the plaintiff September 35 1968. 
The Governmental Immunity Act, Title 30 of Section 63 which 
Governmental Immunity Act took effect July 1, 1966, Section 
63-30-13 reads as follows: 
"63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision--
Time for filing notice-rClalm against city" 
or town for injury on highways, bridges, or' 
other structures.--A claim against a political 
subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice 
-15-
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thereof is filed within ninety days after 
the cause of action arises; provided, however 
that any claim filed against a city or incor-
porated town under section 10-7-77* Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953•,f 
That law requires the filing of the claim in this 
action to be within ninety days after the cause of action arose. 
When did the cause of action arise? Appellant's 
briefs page 19* argues that the city repudiated the option in 
May., 1966. If that is so, the cause of action arose in May of 
1966 and a filing September 3* 1968, does not comply with 
either the old filing law, Section 10-7-77* or the Governmental 
Immunity Act. The latest the cause of action could have arisen 
is December 31, 1966, the date the "option" expires. As to 
that, the ninety day filing applied and a filing September 3* 
1968, is too late. The plaintiff argues that its time for 
filing the claim can be extended for many months by its activities 
on other property which has no relation to the one involved. 
This is not a situation involving "items of account." There 
is no question but that a claim under the statute could have 
been filed and was required to be filed at the latest one year 
after the date of breach which,, under any theory, the last 
day for filing would have been in May of 1967. There is no 
question but what the filing of claims statute is mandatory 
and it was not complied with and; therefore,, this action 
should be dismissed. Under plaintiff's theory, a person 
who suffers a personal injury can extend the time for filing 
-16-
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his claim against the city or other governmental unit until 
released by his doctor and each expense for a doctor's visit 
extends the time for filing. 
The purpose of the filing statute is to advise the 
city officers of the claims so they can be timely investigated 
and protect the city's interest. 
The recent case of Baugh v. Logan City, M-95 P.2d 
81^, 27 Ut.2d 291, involved the time for and necessity of 
filing a claim for breach of contract against a city. The 
case holds that claimed damages for breach of contractual 
obligations are claims which must be filed and the filing 
time is ninety days after the cause of action arises. 
The time begins to run in a breach of contract 
action from when the breach occurs and not when the damage is 
ascertained. M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 
60 Ut. I+35, 211 P. 998. 
No claim was timely filed so this action should be 
dismissed as to the defendant city. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore3 respectfully submitted that the 
Judgment of the court below in favor of all defendants and 
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